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Current emission pledges to the Paris Agreement appear insufficient to hold the global average 11 
temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels1. Yet, details are missing on how to 12 
track progress towards the ‘Paris goal’, inform the five-yearly ‘global stocktake’, and increase the 13 
ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). We develop a nested structure of key 14 
indicators to track progress through time. Global emissions2,3 track aggregated progress1, country-15 
level decomposition track emerging trends4-6 that link directly to NDCs7, and technology diffusion8-10 16 
indicates future reductions. We find the recent slowdown in global emissions growth11 is due to 17 
reduced growth in coal use since 2011, primarily in China and secondarily the United States12. The 18 
slowdown is projected to continue in 2016, with global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry 19 
similar to the 2015 level of 36GtCO2. Explosive and policy-driven growth in wind and solar has 20 
contributed to the global emissions slowdown, but has been less important than economic factors and 21 
energy efficiency. We show that many key indicators are currently broadly consistent with emission 22 
scenarios that keep temperatures below 2°C, but the continued lack of large-scale Carbon Capture and 23 
Storage13 threatens 2030 targets and the longer-term Paris ambition of net-zero emissions. 24 
Tracking progress of individual countries towards a collective global climate target requires a hierarchy 25 
of indicators spanning different levels of detail and time periods (Figure 1). At the aggregate level one 26 
could track global temperature, atmospheric concentrations, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions2,3; 27 
CO2 emissions are particularly relevant due to their dominant role in climate policy and long-lasting 28 
effect in perturbing the climate system. Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry are 29 
projected3 to be 36.4GtCO2 in 2016, approximately the same as in 2014 and 2015, indicating that growth 30 
in global CO2 emissions has stalled for the third year in a row11. While this is a positive step towards 31 
addressing climate change, cumulative emissions are still rising and emissions need to rapidly decrease 32 
until they reach zero to remain consistent with the Paris Agreement1. 33 
More relevant for policy implementation is to track progress nationally to assess historical and future 34 
trends in emissions4-6, progress towards emission pledges14, and the adequacy of pledges to achieve 35 
global targets1. Chinese emissions grew at 10%/yr in the 2000’s, but have been largely stable since 2013 36 
potentially indicating a peak in emissions earlier than expected12. US emissions declined from 2007 to 37 
2012 at over -2%/yr due to a weaker economy, a shift from coal to gas, and growth in renewables15, but 38 
emissions have been relatively flat since 2012. EU emissions declined by -0.7%/yr from 2000-2010 and -39 
2.2%/yr from 2011-2015, ensuring the EU is on track to meeting its 2030 emission pledge. India has 40 
sustained emissions growth of 5-6%/yr over the last decade, and even with its NDC, is expected to have 41 
high future growth rates16.  42 
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It is not clear if the driving forces behind these global and country-level trends will be sustained. If the 43 
observed trends are driven by strengthening of energy and climate policies, then good progress can be 44 
expected towards achieving the NDCs, with flexibility to raise mitigation ambitions. If the trends are 45 
largely due to lingering economic weakness17, or other short-term factors, then emissions growth may 46 
rebound18. Disentangling the factors causing short-term changes in emissions is therefore critical, 47 
otherwise current or future policies may be inconsistent with emission pledges1.  48 
The implementation of the Paris Agreement requires a consistent and harmonised approach to track 49 
progress at different levels of detail and over different time periods. The Kaya Identity is one such 50 
approach5, in which different components form an interconnected and nested structure (Figure 1, see 51 
Methods). Each component of the identity can be decomposed into measurable indicators directly 52 
impacted by energy and climate policy5, which themselves can be further decomposed. Many countries 53 
already express their climate policies in terms of Kaya components, such as the energy intensity of Gross 54 
Domestic Product (GDP), or sub-components such as the share of non-fossil energy in total energy use7.  55 
The indicators in the top three layers of Figure 1 are the outcomes of dynamics that occur at a more 56 
detailed level (bottom two layers). The carbon intensity of fossil fuel combustion (layer 3) can be 57 
reduced by substituting coal with natural gas or with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS; layer 4). The 58 
share of fossil fuels in energy use (layer 3) can be decreased by replacing fossil fuels with renewables 59 
(layer 4). The diffusion of new technologies may require longer-term investments19, which may be 60 
tracked9 via private and public investments16, price declines8, and deployment13 (layer 5). More rapid 61 
technological progress would support and drive increased ambition of country pledges.  62 
We explore this nested structure using global and country-level data (Figure 1). We focus on the Kaya-63 
derived indicators: CO2 emissions (layer 1); GDP, energy intensity of GDP (e.g., energy efficiency), and 64 
CO2 per energy unit (layer 2); and CO2 intensity of fossil fuels and share of fossil fuels in total energy use 65 
(layer 3). These indicators are the most relevant for the current slowdown in CO2 emissions growth11, 66 
are important indicators in low-emission scenarios20, and cover energy-related indicators used in the 67 
NDCs. We focus on CO2 emissions from the energy system, representing 70% of global GHG emissions in 68 
20105. The drivers are different5 for non-CO2 GHGs, such as agriculture, and CO2 emissions not derived 69 
from energy use, such as cement (5%) and land-use change (10% total CO2 emissions).  70 
A decomposition of the world and key countries (Figure 2, Supplementary Figure 1) shows that, over 71 
long periods, growth in GDP (green) has exerted upward pressure on CO2 emissions, in most cases only 72 
partially offset by downward pressure from improved energy intensity of GDP (purple) and lower carbon 73 
intensity of energy (orange). Country trajectories differ, but when averaging over years to decades to 74 
remove interannual variability, three developments are particularly relevant for changes in emission 75 
trajectories (Figure 2). First, GDP growth in the EU28, US, and China has been lower in the decade 2005-76 
2015 compared to 1995-2005 (values in 2010 and 2000 in Figure 2) leading to lower emissions growth in 77 
the later period. The apparent increase in GDP growth since 2013 in the US and globally is partially due 78 
to the reduced influence of the global financial crisis in 2008/2009 from the smoothing process (see 79 
Methods, and compare Figure 2 and Supplementary Figure 1). Second, improvements in the energy 80 
intensity of GDP (Figure 2, purple) have ensured that energy use has grown more slowly than GDP 81 
(Supplementary Figure 2). The declines in energy intensity are an important long-term trend as 82 
economies develop, become more efficient, and shift to services5. Third, there are signs of emerging 83 
declines in carbon intensity of energy globally, in China and the US, and of continual declines in the EU28 84 
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(Figure 2, orange). The declining energy and carbon intensities ensure that CO2 emissions grow at a 85 
slower rate than GDP (Figure 2, black line).  86 
Emission scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement (Figure 3, top) show that stringent climate 87 
policy is expected to only slightly accelerate historical improvements in energy intensity compared to 88 
baseline scenarios. In contrast, the scenarios indicate that significant mitigation is achieved by deep and 89 
sustained reductions in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 3, bottom). Identifying signs of emerging 90 
downward trends in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 2) could be an early indicator of progress in 91 
mitigation.  92 
Due to the importance of carbon intensity of energy in emission scenarios and for emerging trends, we 93 
decompose the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 2, orange) into the share of fossil fuels in total energy 94 
use and carbon intensity of fossil fuel combustion (Level 3 in Figure 1; Figure 4). The trends vary by 95 
country21, indicating the effectiveness of different factors. China has shown a decline in the share of 96 
fossil fuels in total energy use (orange) driven by renewables growth, with continual improvements in 97 
the carbon emitted per unit of fossil fuel (green) due to a declining coal share. The US show declines in 98 
carbon per unit of fossil fuel consumed (green) representing the gains from a shift from coal to natural 99 
gas, with smaller reductions from growth in renewables (orange). Results for the US are consistent with 100 
an earlier study15, but we find that coal to gas is more important than the expansion of renewables22 101 
(Figure 4). The EU carbon intensity decline is dominated by the growing share of renewables in total 102 
energy use (orange), with decreasing gains from the carbon emitted from fossil fuel use (green). There 103 
are no clear trends in India. Globally, after a period of rapid recarbonisation6 in the 2000’s, there 104 
appears to be an emerging trend of declining carbon intensity, primarily driven by an increased share of 105 
non-fossil energy sources, consistent with requirements of 2°C scenarios (Figure 3, bottom).  106 
Despite the improvements in the carbon intensity of energy, and its components (Figure 4), energy use 107 
remains the dominant driver of CO2 emissions (Supplementary Figure 3). Although there has been strong 108 
growth in solar and wind power recently, the growth in global energy use has largely been dominated by 109 
increases in fossil fuel use and, to a lesser extent, nuclear and hydro-power (Supplementary Figure 4). 110 
Because of the recent decline in Chinese coal use12, the contribution of renewables growth to total 111 
energy growth was remarkably large globally in 2015 (~50%). In recent years, the use of fossil fuels in 112 
the US and EU declined, and the relative contributions of the growth in wind and solar power are 113 
significant and, in some years, dominant.  114 
The recent gains in renewable energy use are significant, but it will be difficult for renewable energy to 115 
supply the entire annual growth in total energy use in the short-term unless growth in global energy use 116 
further declines. If the annual growth in total energy use remains stable or declines, global CO2 117 
emissions are likely to remain flat or even decline. A return to stronger GDP and energy growth could 118 
lead to renewed growth in emissions through increased capacity utilisation of existing coal power plants 119 
and rapid construction of new ones23. Policies locking in the recent reductions in coal use and avoiding 120 
new capacity additions12 can potentially avert a rebound18.  121 
Future changes in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 3) will be driven by the development and 122 
deployment of alternative technologies (Level 4, Figure 1). Scenarios consistent with the Paris goal 123 
require a decreasing fossil fuel share in energy use (Figure 5a). Despite the large increase in fossil energy 124 
use in the last decades, current fossil energy trends remain consistent with many 2°C scenarios 125 
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(Supplementary Figure 5). For this consistency to continue, declines in fossil energy, particularly coal, 126 
need to be initiated soon, particularly given existing infrastructure lock-in24.  127 
The relatively high fossil energy use in many 2°C scenarios is predicated on large-scale deployment of 128 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)25 (Figure 5b). In addition, most scenarios require strong growth in 129 
bioenergy (Figure 5d), a large share of which is linked with CCS for carbon dioxide removal25,26. It is 130 
uncertain whether bioenergy can be sustainably produced and made carbon-neutral at the scales 131 
required27,28. Compounding this, without large-scale CCS deployment most models cannot produce 132 
emission pathways consistent with the 2°C goal20,26. Despite its importance, CCS deployment has 133 
continued to lag behind expectations13. Emission scenarios require a rapid ramp up of CCS facilities, 134 
potentially 4000 facilities by 2030 (Figure 5b, Supplementary Figure 6), compared to the tens currently 135 
proposed by 202029. Given the lack of focus on CCS in emission pledges7, a globally coordinated effort is 136 
needed to accelerate progress13, better understand the technological risks25, and address social 137 
acceptability30. 138 
Renewable energies are currently tracking well with the requirements of most 2°C emission scenarios 139 
(Figure 5). Despite the extraordinary growth rates of wind and solar in recent years, greatly accelerated 140 
expansion is required in the next decades. Most scenarios have limited scope for large-scale hydropower 141 
expansion due to geophysical constraints. Further, most scenarios indicate strong growth in nuclear 142 
energy, but there is renewed uncertainty from the drop in public support since the 2011 Fukushima 143 
Daiichi accident. Scenarios indicate that renewables alone may not be sufficient to stay below 2°C given 144 
physical constraints to large-scale deployment and the need to offset emissions in some sectors20, such 145 
as agriculture.  146 
Current trends in many indicators appear broadly consistent with many of the emission scenarios that 147 
limit warming to well below 2°C (Figure 5), but this masks four critical issues. First, studies clearly show 148 
that up to 2030, current emission pledges quickly deviate from what is required to be consistent with 149 
the Paris goal1. Second, current trends of some key technologies (e.g., CCS) deviate substantially from 150 
long-term requirements to meet the Paris goal. Third, if some technologies lag considerably behind 151 
expectations13 or requirements20, then other technologies will need more rapid deployment and higher 152 
penetration levels into energy systems, a particularly important constraint for carbon dioxide removal25. 153 
Fourth, there is the lack of scenarios exploring opportunities and challenges of transformational lifestyle 154 
and behavioural changes, low-CCS and high renewables31, alternative forms of carbon dioxide 155 
removal26,32 and solar radiation management33.  156 
The nested structure we have demonstrated and applied (Figure 1) facilitates the tracking of key 157 
indicators that need significant change to avoid 2°C of warming. The methodology allows consistent and 158 
robust decomposition of current emissions, energy, and technology trends, and helps identifying key 159 
policy needs. We argue that extending tracking across indicators, scales, and time periods will increase 160 
the likelihood that policies will be implemented that ensure the societal transition consistent with the 161 
Paris Agreement. 162 
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Methods  236 
Hierarchical Framework. The framework is not unique and different indicators can be used depending 237 
on the focus. We have chosen to focus on primary energy, though final energy could be used to 238 
incorporate efficiency losses in energy conversion and end-use efficiency. We have included fossil CCS in 239 
the carbon intensity indicator as electricity is still produced from fossil fuels, but with lower emissions. 240 
We have not included carbon dioxide removal (e.g., afforestation, direct air capture) unless it leads to 241 
energy production (e.g., BECCS).  242 
Kaya Identity. We apply the Kaya Identity in our core analysis5 243 
𝐶 = 𝐺×
𝐸
𝐺
×
𝐶
𝐸
= 𝐺×𝐼𝐸×𝐼𝐶 244 
where C is CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel use, G is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant prices, 245 
E is total primary energy use (fossil- and non-fossil fuels), IE is the energy use per unit GDP (energy 246 
intensity of GDP), and IC is the carbon emissions per unit energy use (carbon intensity of energy). We do 247 
not include population as a separate component, and instead focus on aggregated GDP. We find it is 248 
useful to further decompose the carbon intensity of energy, 249 
𝐼𝐶 =
𝐶
𝐸𝐹
×
𝐸𝐹
𝐸
= 𝐹𝑖×𝐹𝑠 250 
where EF is the fossil primary energy use, Fi is the carbon intensity of fossil fuel use and Fs is the share of 251 
fossil-fuel use in total energy use. 252 
Decomposition. We performing Index Decomposition Analysis34 (IDA) as we do not aim to assess 253 
structural changes. Further, we keep the number of components in each decomposition low to avoid 254 
difficulties interpreting the driver of changes35. A decomposition with n factors has n! unique 255 
decompositions and there are a variety of ways of dealing with non-uniqueness. We take standard 256 
forward differences and keep the interaction terms separate. As an example of a two factor 257 
decomposition, f=xy, 258 
∆𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡)∆𝑥 + 𝑥(𝑡)∆𝑦 + ∆𝑥∆𝑦 259 
where Δx(t)=x(t+Δt)-x(t). The strength of this approach is that in relative terms 260 
∆𝑓
𝑓(𝑡)
=
∆𝑥
𝑥(𝑡)
+
∆𝑦
𝑦(𝑡)
+ (
∆𝑥
𝑥(𝑡)
∆𝑦
𝑦(𝑡)
) 261 
each term is the standard annual growth rate (in percent) of each factor and the magnitude of the 262 
interaction term can be isolated to assess its implications35. For example, for each year in Figure 2 the 263 
growth rate of CO2 emissions is the sum of the growth rates of GDP, energy intensity, and carbon 264 
intensity, with a small interaction term (labelled ‘cross’). Our approach is most relevant for historical, 265 
and short- to medium-term trends. If emissions cross zero, then the method may need to be revised. 266 
Data. As explained in the main text, we focus on CO2 emissions from fossil fuels only. The CO2 emissions 267 
data3 is from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center36 (CDIAC) up to 2013 with 2014 and 2015 268 
projected by fuel-type based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy37, but for developed countries 269 
we overwrite this data from 1990 to 2014 using official reports to the UNFCCC. The CDIAC emissions 270 
8 
 
data did not include the full revisions to Chinese data38, so we followed the BP methodology37 to 271 
estimate the emissions by fuel type (to be consistent with CDIAC). The difference between Chinese 272 
estimates of CDIAC and BP were propagated through to the global total to ensure consistency. Energy 273 
data is taken from BP, which scales up all non-fossil energy sources by a factor 0.38 to account for 274 
different efficiencies of fossil and non-fossil fuels in producing final energy39. Further, BP only reports 275 
commercial bioenergy and we include traditional bioenergy from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 276 
to be consistent with the IPCC. We do note, however, that traditional40 and future25,26 bioenergy may 277 
not be sustainable or fully carbon neutral. GDP is taken from UN and is measured in constant 2005 278 
prices41.  279 
Data challenges: Our analysis faces important data challenges, but these should not affect our findings 280 
unduly. First, most developed countries officially report emission statistics (Annex I countries to the 281 
UNFCCC), though this will change as the Paris Agreement is implemented42. This limitation means that 282 
we have to source emission data for developing countries (non-Annex I countries) from non-official 283 
sources3. Second, economic and energy use data consistent with the reported emissions are rarely 284 
reported. Even though energy, economic, and emission statistics are ultimately all derived from official 285 
national data, third-party data suppliers and national governments may apply different assumptions, 286 
limiting the ability to reliably track some NDCs. These challenges mean that we need to ensure our 287 
findings are not due to inconsistencies between different datasets. These issues have implications far 288 
beyond our analysis, and highlight the need for harmonised official reporting of economic, energy, and 289 
emission statistics. 290 
Projections. To estimate emissions in 2016 we separate out China, the US, and treat the rest of the 291 
world separately3. For China, we use monthly data from a variety of Chinese sources to estimate full 292 
year emissions3. For the US, we use estimates of fossil-fuel emissions from the US Energy Information 293 
Administration43, and supplement with estimates of cement3. For the remaining countries, we add the 294 
10-year average growth in CO2/GDP to GDP growth projections from the International Monetary Fund3. 295 
As emphasised elsewhere3, the 2016 estimates have additional uncertainties and the estimates should 296 
not be over interpreted.  297 
Data Availability. The CO2 emissions data are available from the Global Carbon Budget 2016 v1.0 298 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3334/CDIAC/GCP_2016. All energy data except for bioenergy are taken 299 
from the 2016 edition of BP’s “Statistical Review of World Energy” available at 300 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/co2-301 
emissions.html. Bioenergy data (used only in Figure 5d) are from the International Energy Agency’s 302 
“World Energy Balances”, available at http://data.iea.org/payment/products/103-world-energy-303 
statistics-and-balances-2016-edition.aspx. GDP to 2014 is taken from the 2015 edition of the UN 304 
Statistics Divisions dataset “GDP and its breakdown at constant 2005 prices in US Dollars” available at 305 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp. GDP for 2015 is from the International Monetary Fund’s 306 
April 2016 World Economic Outlook available at 307 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/index.htm. The AR5 scenario database is available 308 
at https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB. The data are also available from the corresponding author upon 309 
reasonable request. 310 
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Figure 1: A schematic hierarchy of potential indicators for tracking progress of the Paris Agreement at different levels. This 335 
schematic is not unique or exhaustive, and represents a disaggregation of indicators relevant for our analysis of recent trends in 336 
emissions, with a focus on the carbon intensity of energy (CO2/Energy). The upper layers are closer to the outcomes of policy, 337 
often used in emission pledges (emissions, emission intensity), while the lower layers represent more detailed technology inputs 338 
required to meet the outcomes. The structure can be analyzed over different time periods (years, decades). Each layer 339 
represents components of similar aggregation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product, CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage, BECCS: 340 
Bioenergy with CCS; Others: nuclear, hydro, and other forms of renewable energy.  341 
342 
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 343 
Figure 2: A Kaya Identity decomposition of CO2 emissions and its immediate drivers (Levels 1 & 2 in Figure 1), for the world (a), 344 
China (b), USA (c), EU28 (d), India (e), and the rest of the World (f); note varying y-axes. The data is smoothed with a 11-year 345 
window to show longer term trends, and the grey shading from 2010-2015 represents a diminishing window length as 2015 is 346 
approached. The missing data before 1995 is since there is no GDP data for the EU28 before 1990. Growth in GDP exerts upward 347 
pressure on emissions, energy efficiency (Energy/GDP) downward pressure, and in recent years, carbon intensity (CO2/Energy) 348 
downward pressure. “Cross” is a small interaction term (see Methods). See Supplementary Figure 1 for a non-smoothed version.  349 
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 350 
Figure 3: Energy intensity of GDP (top) and carbon intensity of energy (bottom), both shown in Level 2 of Figure 1. Data is shown 351 
for the historical period (black), the 2°C scenarios assessed in AR539, and the median of the associated baselines (brown). The 352 
116 2°C scenarios are split into different categories with global climate policies starting in 2010 (blue), 2020 (red), and 2030 353 
(orange). The light lines are individual scenarios and the dark with white markers medians. Historically and in the long-term, 354 
Energy/GDP has trended downwards and the 2°C scenarios suggest only a slight acceleration to bridge the baseline trend with 355 
the 2°C scenarios. The scenarios indicate that most future mitigation is due to reductions in CO2/Energy, and this partly explains 356 
our focus on this term in our analysis.  357 
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 358 
Figure 4: A decomposition of the carbon intensity (CO2/Energy) into the carbon intensity of fossil fuel use (CO2/Fossil, called 359 
Fossil Intensity) and the share of fossil fuels in energy use (Fossil/Energy), Level 3 in Figure 1. Data shown are for the world (a), 360 
China (b), USA (c), EU28 (d), India (e), and the rest of the World (f). The data has been smoothed with a 11-year window to show 361 
longer term trends, and the grey shading from 2010-2015 represents a diminishing window length as 2015 is approached. The 362 
missing data for the EU before 1995 is since there is no data before 1990. “Cross” is a negligible interaction term (see Methods). 363 
364 
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 365 
Figure 5: Historical trends and future pathways for the fossil share of primary energy (a), fossil and bioenergy CCS (b), and 366 
renewable energy use disaggregated into solar and wind (c), biomass (d), nuclear (e), and hydropower (f). All panels show the 367 
historical period (black), the 2°C scenarios assessed in AR5, and the median of the associated baselines (brown). The 116 2°C 368 
scenarios are split into different categories with global climate policies starting in 2010 (blue), 2020 (red), and 2030 (orange). 369 
The light lines are individual scenarios and the dark with white markers medians. Current trends appear to track well with most 370 
2°C scenarios, with the notable exception of CCS. If CCS does not live up to expectations, then alternative energy sources will be 371 
required to grow faster over longer periods of time. Additional energy sources and longer time periods are shown in 372 
Supplementary Figure 5, and Supplementary Figure 6 shows panel b (CCS) to 2100 in energy units (EJ/yr) and the amount of CO2 373 
captured (GtCO2/yr).  374 
